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The Latin American experience suggests primary elections can
be effective but not a magic recipe for party democratisation
Both Labour and the Conservatives have been experimenting with primary elections to select candidates, as a
means of reconnecting their parties with the electorate at a time of diminishing membership levels. There are
lessons to be learned from countries around the world that use primaries. In this post, Flavia Freidenberg
and Julia Pomares discuss the experience of Latin America, where a range of different systems for candidate
selection are in place. 
The United States and Argentine presidents Barack Obama and Cristina Fernández were both selected by their parties in primary
elections before facing the electorate for a second time at a general election. Credit: Casa Rosada, CC BY-SA 2.0
A recent op-ed published in the New York Times presented a controversial argument: the chief American victory
in exporting democracy is not to be found in the Middle East but rather in the near West, in the shape of the
promotion of primaries as the main mechanism for political candidate selection in Latin America and Europe.
The great variation in design of candidate selection processes across Latin America seems to be at odds with a
mirroring of the American experience. Interestingly, Latin Americans did export the term ‘primaries’ but no Latin
American country conducts primaries in the American way. In any case, there is no doubt that the use of internal
elections as a method for presidential candidate nomination has risen dramatically, with almost 60 internal
electoral processes in the last 20 years in Latin America. These experiences are increasingly a source of debate
among the region’s politicians, academics and media.
Against a background of sharp decline in party legitimacy, frequent party infighting and increased party
fragmentation in Latin America, internal elections emerged as a magical recipe for party reform in several
countries of the region.  They soon evolved into“ the Queen of party modernization reforms”. As such, they have
been asked to deliver several – and sometimes competing – goals: promoting intra-party democracy, solving
conflicts between  party factions, strengthening party links with society and institutionalizing party systems and
electoral coalitions.
What lessons can we learn from their extensive use in Latin America over almost two decades? Today, thirteen
Latin American countries have legislation allowing for internal competition for presidential candidate nomination. In
eleven, the reform took place as of the mid-nineties. But there is no one model fitting all countries. Variation in the
design of the candidate selection mechanism can be seen across three main dimensions (see chart below).
Types of internal elections in Latin America
Note: Mexico is not included here because it is currently under reform.
The first has to do with the obligatory nature of the mechanism: whereas some countries impose primaries on
political parties as the only method for selecting their candidates, others regulate its implementation but give
parties the option not to use it. Costa Rica is the country with the longest tradition of compulsory internal elections
(1949), but it relaxed the system in 2010. Uruguay introduced compulsory primaries in 1996 to replace the double
simultaneous vote (an electoral system in which the internal election is simultaneous with the general one, in
place since 1922) and Argentina followed suit in 2009 after a failed attempt at reform in 2002.  In Argentina,
primaries are not only compulsory for parties but also for voters (applying the same penalties on non-voters as in
general elections).
The second dimension relates to the date of the election – whether it is simultaneous for all parties or not. The
idea behind having all parties select candidates on the same day has more to do with strategic partisan
considerations than concerns about money.  Some party leaders fear that the members of other parties will vote
for candidates that most suit their own strategic ends. Only in three countries (Argentina, Uruguay and Honduras)
are primaries held simultaneously.
The third dimension relates to who is entitled to participate  in the internal election; ranging from only party
members – closed elections – (Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Honduras) to the whole electorate (Argentina). The
debate over the size of the electorate is an important one. When the internal election is open to the whole
electorate, the dispute over internal problems is transferred to the electorate at large and, on some occasions,
intense disputes among candidates arise during the general election campaign. When the internal election is
open to independents but party member registers are not reliable (as in many Latin American countries), it is more
likely that members of one party intervene in other parties’ internal elections.
What conclusions can we draw from the extensive use of primaries in Latin American countries? We posit three
here:
1. In several countries, internal elections have fared better at reinforcing parties’ leaders than strengthening
parties’ roots, having failed to contribute to intra-party democracy.  In cases like Mexico or Panama,
elections have tended to be non-competitive and candidates selected by internal elections have not been
the most competent in the eyes of the electorate;
2. Although difficult to measure empirically, party leaders in several countries perceive that the use of internal
elections to nominate candidates has not led to an electoral advantage. In those countries (Dominican
Republic, Mexico, Panama or Ecuador, for example), strong opposition to internal elections has increased
among senior party figures;
3. Evidence from Argentina  shows that simultaneous, open and compulsory primaries, conducted close to the
general elections, can work as a mock first round, driving voters to behave strategically and change their
electoral choices across elections.
Also, based on experiences so far, we can highlight some examples of best practice regarding the institutional
design of Latin American internal elections:
1. Even where internal elections are not compulsory but parties can decide to conduct them, there is a need
for supervision by the election authority and for a legal framework (such as in Colombia, Bolivia and Chile);
2. A reliable register of party members is a key pre-requisite for any type of internal election, in particular
when the internal election is funded by the state (like Mexico);
3. Results of internal elections should be binding (Chile) and parties should be penalized if they register and
field candidates other than those winning those internal elections.
The Latin American experience shows that internal elections can be a useful tool for promoting party
democratization if they are carried out in favourable conditions: when reforms take place in contexts where there
are strong incentives to adhere to them, the chances of primaries being successful increase dramatically.
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